

## Accelerated Article Preview

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# Digital measurement of SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk from 7 million contacts

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## Summary

How likely is it to become infected by SARS-CoV-2 after being exposed? Virtually everyone has wondered about this question during the COVID-19 pandemic. Contact tracing apps<sup>1,2</sup> recorded measurements of proximity<sup>3</sup> and duration between nearby smartphones. Contacts - individuals exposed to confirmed cases - were notified according to public health policies such as the 2-metre 15-minute guideline<sup>4,5</sup>, despite limited evidence supporting this threshold. Here we analysed 7 million contacts notified by the NHS COVID-19 app<sup>6,7</sup> in England and Wales to infer how app measurements translated to actual transmissions. Empirical metrics and statistical modelling showed a strong relation between app-computed risk scores and actual transmission probability. Longer exposures at greater distances had similar risk to shorter exposures at closer distances. The probability of transmission confirmed by a reported positive test increased initially linearly with duration of exposure (1.1% per hour) and continued increasing over several days. While most exposures were short (median 0.7 hours, IQR 0.4-1.6), transmissions typically resulted from exposures lasting one hour to several days (median 6 hours, IQR 1.4-28). Households accounted for about 6% of contacts but 40% of transmissions. With sufficient preparation, privacy-preserving yet precise

analyses of risk that would inform public health measures, based on digital contact tracing, could be performed within weeks of a new pathogen emerging.

## Introduction

Non-pharmaceutical measures such as social distancing, testing, contact tracing and quarantine are effective approaches to control the spread of epidemics, but they also entail significant social and economic costs<sup>8,9</sup>. It would be desirable to adjust these measures throughout an epidemic as epidemiological understanding increases or as the pathogen evolves. Optimising such interventions requires methods to quantify transmission risk factors.

Despite the large amount of SARS-CoV-2 data collected globally, quantitative risk assessments at the level of individual exposures have been limited to a few large-scale manual contact tracing studies<sup>10,11</sup>. Another approach is provided by contact tracing apps on smartphones, which were implemented for COVID-19 in many countries. These apps digitised the process of contact tracing based on recording close-proximity events between smartphones<sup>1</sup>, performing quantitative risk assessment by measuring proximity<sup>3,12,13</sup> and duration of exposure to cases, although their real-life accuracy has been questioned<sup>14–17</sup>. Contact tracing apps are useful for public health if they are able to estimate the risk of pathogen transmission and should be evaluated to improve their functionality and ensure public trust<sup>2,18</sup>.

For contact tracing and more generally for distancing guidelines, public health authorities worldwide often used a binary classification of risk, e.g. whether or not individuals spent 15 minutes or more at a distance of 2 metres or less from a case<sup>4,5</sup>. Contact tracing apps were calibrated to approximately match these heuristic rules. In the UK, which experienced a large-scale epidemic and implemented a substantial test-and-trace infrastructure, this advice led to more than 20 million notifications and quarantine requests from manual<sup>19</sup> and digital<sup>20</sup> contact tracing, with a peak of over 1.5 million per week in July 2021. The socioeconomic costs could have been significantly mitigated by improved, fine-tuned guidelines for contact tracing and quarantine. Doing this would require two ingredients: (i) data and methods for quantitative assessment of how the probability of transmission varies with different factors, (ii) tools to measure those risk factors for contacts, to estimate their individual level of risk and respond appropriately.

Digital contact tracing in England and Wales was implemented through the NHS COVID-19 App<sup>6</sup> which was active on 13 to 18 million smartphones each day during 2021<sup>7</sup>. The app recorded measurements of the proximity and duration of exposure to an

index case using the privacy-preserving Exposure Notification framework<sup>21</sup> with custom analysis of Bluetooth signal attenuation between smartphones to estimate proximity<sup>22</sup>. By relating this data to whether the exposed individual subsequently reported a positive test through the app, we provide the first analysis of how the probability of SARS-CoV-2 transmission varied with app-recorded measurements. We analysed 7 million exposure notifications from April 2021 to February 2022 comprising 23 million hours of cumulative exposure and 240,000 positive tests reported after notification. We demonstrate that the NHS COVID-19 app accurately translated proximity and duration of exposure into a meaningful epidemiological risk score and we quantify how these factors affected the actual probability of transmission.

## Results

We use the term *case* to mean an individual whose infection was confirmed by testing, *index case* to mean a case who triggered a contact tracing process, and *contact* to mean an individual identified as having had some level of exposure to an index case (including, in general, individuals whose level of exposure is evaluated as being below some risk threshold).

The NHS COVID-19 app assessed the transmission risk for a contact by partitioning the full exposure event into a set of non-overlapping 'exposure windows', each lasting at most 30 minutes. For each window, the app calculated a risk score<sup>23,24</sup>:

*Risk score = proximity score × duration within the 30-minute window × infectiousness score*

The proximity score was constant below 1 metre, and decreased as the inverse square of the distance if greater than 1 metre. A scaling of risk in proportion to duration follows from microbial risk assessment expectations. Infectiousness was scored as either 'standard', 'high' (2.5x), or zero depending on the timing of exposure relative to the index case symptom onset date (or positive test date when no symptom onset was recorded)<sup>23,25</sup>. For ease of interpretation, we normalised the risk score such that it equals 1 for an exposure at 2 metres' distance from an index case with standard infectiousness for 15 minutes (i.e. the typical threshold for manual contact tracing), implying a maximum possible score of 20.

Contacts were notified of a risky exposure if they had at least one exposure window with a risk score exceeding the threshold for notification, which was 1.11 with our normalisation (Extended Data Figure 1 shows the threshold in distance-duration space). When a contact was notified, their app sent anonymous exposure data to the central server. This data was sent in separate unlinked data 'packets', one for each exposure window that had a risk score over the notification threshold (about half of the contacts had more than one exposure window, see Extended Data Table 1). These packets

formed the basis for our analysis: we analysed only contacts who were notified and had at least one exposure above the risk threshold. We grouped windows likely to have come from the same contact as a recording of the whole exposure history between that contact and the associated index case (excluding windows below the notification threshold). If a given individual was notified multiple times during our study, each notification was treated as though it were of a separate contact due to the absence of unique identifiers.

The data also indicated whether the contact reported a positive SARS-CoV-2 test through the app during an interval beginning with their notification and ending 14 days after the exposure. The fraction of contacts doing so defines the *probability of reported infection*. This is a proxy for the true probability of being infected, though it is significantly underestimated: an unknown but likely appreciable fraction of infected app users either did not seek a test, or did not report their positive result through the app, or reported it outside of the aforementioned interval. As a reference, the number of infections in adults in the same period in the UK was 2-3 times greater than the number of cases<sup>26</sup>.

The linkage between exposure measurements and reported test positivity enables apps to be used for precision epidemiological estimation while preserving privacy. We analysed how contacts' exposure data, recorded in separate 30-minute windows, can predict their probability of reporting a positive test following their exposure. The peak risk experienced by an individual can be summarised by the maximum risk score measured by the app among all of their 30-minute exposure windows. This summary metric is what the app actually used: contacts were notified only when it was above the threshold. We found an increasing probability of reported infection as the maximum risk score increased (Figure 1a). This pattern holds irrespective of season or epidemic wave (Figure 1b). This simple analysis demonstrates that the approach used by the app to calculate risk correlates with the actual risk of transmission.

We defined two more summary metrics of risk measurements for each contact: the total duration of the exposure and the cumulative risk score, both aggregated over all exposure windows from the contact. Both of these metrics are more discriminatory than the maximum risk score. The probability of reported infection continues increasing as the duration and cumulative risk increase, even after several days of cumulative exposure (Figure 1).

These results suggest that the instantaneous level of risk and the duration of exposure both affect the risk of transmission. We also expect a background level of risk from exposures not recorded or not reported by the app; we estimated this level by

statistically modelling it as proportional to the local risk of infection among app users at that time (see Methods). We therefore stratified contacts by two summary metrics of their app-recorded measurements simultaneously: the duration of their exposure and their mean risk score per unit time. For each stratum of contacts we calculated the fraction reporting a positive test through the app during the observation window, as previously, now also subtracting the estimated background risk; we refer to the resulting quantity as the *probability of reported transmission*. (This differs from the *probability of reported infection* in that the background has been subtracted, and thus we attribute transmission to the exposures measured by the app. Both of these probabilities are lower than the corresponding true probabilities due to incomplete reporting.) As expected, we found that the level of risk measured by the app and the duration of the exposure both contribute to the probability of reported transmission (Figure 2). Duration is the more important predictor. For short exposures the probability of reported transmission grows linearly with duration at a rate of 1.1% per hour, increasing sublinearly only after a few hours (Extended Data Figure 2).

These results suggest that overall risk is determined by contributions from each separate exposure window, with greater contributions from riskier windows, in addition to the background risk. To disentangle these effects we used a statistical model for combined contributions to overall risk, estimating the separate contributions from each window and from the background. We refer to these separate contributions from each exposure window as the *probability of reported transmission per exposure window*. We found that the probability of reported transmission per exposure window was proportional to the app's risk score for that window with remarkable accuracy, increasing by 0.3% per unit, providing validation that the app's risk calculation is epidemiologically meaningful. Figure 3 shows this relationship for exposures lasting between 1 and 3 hours. The relationship is robust with respect to individual heterogeneities or underreporting of positive tests among contacts (Extended Data Figure 3).

Heterogeneities in the context of an exposure are expected to have a large effect on transmission risk. While the context is not recorded by the app, date and geographical area may be correlated with context and other causal factors. As an example, the probability of transmission from low-risk exposures is higher over the weekend than on weekdays (Extended Data Figure 4), while the probability of transmission appears to be lower in London and other conurbations than in rural and urban areas (towns and cities), particularly at the lower end of the risk spectrum (Extended Data Figure 4).

The impact of transmission control measures that target risk factors is determined by the distribution of these factors in the population, as well as how predictive they are of

195 risk. Figures 4a-c show the population distributions over contacts of the maximum and  
196 cumulative risk score and the total duration of the exposure. We show the distributions  
197 separately for (i) all contacts, and (ii) transmissions, i.e. only those contacts who  
198 reported a positive test result through the app in the observation window, for whom we  
199 attributed the infection to the recorded exposure. All distributions are strongly left-  
200 skewed, with low risk scores and short durations most common among contacts, in  
201 agreement with previous observations in specific contexts such as university  
202 campuses<sup>27</sup>. Larger risk scores and longer durations are seen disproportionately more  
203 for transmissions than for all contacts, in keeping with our earlier results and  
204 mechanistic understanding of pathogen transmission risk. Across all contacts, most  
205 exposures are brief (median duration 40 minutes), yet most detected exposures that  
206 result in transmission last several hours (median duration 6 hours; 82% last more than 1  
207 hour) (Figure 4e), suggesting that contact tracing for SARS-CoV-2 would retain >80% of  
208 its effectiveness if applied with a threshold of one hour. Cumulative risk and duration  
209 show a bimodal distribution for transmissions; duration has a wide distribution (IQR 1.4-  
210 28 hours) with a peak at around 1-2 hours of exposure and another peak at around 1-2  
211 full days of cumulative exposure, the latter most likely corresponding to household  
212 contacts.

213  
214 To clarify the contribution of different exposure patterns and contexts to SARS-CoV-2  
215 spread, we classified contacts into four categories intended to approximately reflect  
216 different contexts: contacts exposed for at least 8 hours in a day (household contacts),  
217 non-household contacts with recurring exposures on multiple days, contacts exposed  
218 during a single day (between 30 minutes and 8 hours), and fleeting contacts (less than  
219 30 minutes). Household and recurring contacts accounted for 6% and 14% of all app-  
220 recorded contacts but were responsible for 41% and 24% of transmissions respectively  
221 (Figure 4d). The long duration of household exposures—33 hours on average—and  
222 their closer proximity explain their disproportionate role in transmissions (Extended Data  
223 Table 2).

224  
225 How effective are these app-measured predictors for binary risk classification for  
226 contacts? Panels e-f of Figure 4 show the sensitivity-specificity tradeoff among contacts  
227 from using different thresholds on duration. Extended Data Figure 5 shows the tradeoff  
228 for several predictors, including machine-learning classifiers using binned counts of risk  
229 scores and extra information such as background risk, date and region. There was a  
230 small improvement in classification by using duration or cumulative risk instead of  
231 maximum risk, and the only significant further gain came from the inclusion of  
232 background risk. In fact, duration and background risk alone were enough for a near-  
233 optimal prediction with an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve of 0.73.

234

These quantitative risk measurements enable optimisation of a variety of management strategies based on simple and effective predictors such as duration of exposure to a case. As an example, we previously proposed milder ‘amber’ notifications as an alternative to quarantine for intermediate-risk contacts during the pandemic<sup>1,28</sup> and these were implemented in some settings<sup>29</sup>. If amber notifications would be optimally assigned for intermediate durations of exposure, pursuing an optimised strategy of PCR testing following an amber notification could reduce the socioeconomic costs of an illustrative intervention by 30-50% for a similar epidemiological impact (Extended Data Figure 6), or increased its effectiveness by 30-50% for similar costs (Extended Data Figure 7).

## Discussion

We performed the first large-scale study of how SARS-CoV-2 transmission probability varies with app-recorded risk measurements of the proximity and duration of exposures, analysing data from 7 million contacts notified by the NHS COVID-19 app in England and Wales. We found that the probability of infection strongly correlated with duration of exposure, as well as with the maximum and cumulative risk scores measured by the app. As a measure of proximity, the app’s risk score for individual exposure windows captured the relative probability of transmission with remarkable accuracy. Furthermore, the app-measured cumulative risk score was the best single predictor of probability of transmission among those tested, in agreement with expectations from microbial risk modelling (see Supplementary Methods Section 1.5). This provides highly encouraging validation for the risk modelling underlying the NHS COVID-19 App<sup>23,30</sup> and for future development of similar tools.

Our results have immediate implications for contact tracing. We found that the cumulative duration of exposure to infected individuals is a key predictor of transmission in the COVID-19 pandemic, and needs to be accounted for in preparation for future epidemics of respiratory pathogens. Since duration of exposure to known cases can usually be recalled without the support of digital tools, it could be immediately incorporated into manual contact tracing interviews. Contacts should be notified and managed based on duration of exposure as well as other risk factors; knowledge transfer should prove relatively easy, e.g. through automated tools to support manual contact tracing staff with their interview-based risk assessment. Beyond identification of predictors of infection, our quantitative risk measurements also enable optimisation of different public health outcomes and epidemic management strategies such as amber notifications and post-exposure prophylaxis.



A result of particular importance beyond contact tracing is our empirical demonstration of the continuing increase in probability of transmission with the duration of exposure to an infected individual. Spending a long time at greater distance from an infected person carries similar risk to shorter times at smaller distances. 'Physical distancing' strategies to reduce risk should therefore consider the relevance of time as well as space. The continued increase in risk that we observed over multiple days shows that individuals can still benefit by beginning precautionary measures even after having already spent days exposed to an index case, for example in the same household.

The effectiveness of epidemic control measures depends on the population distribution of risk. Exposures are highly skewed towards short and low-risk encounters; on the other hand, transmissions are caused by exposures in a wide range of risk, with duration varying from an hour to several days. Our results can pave the way towards more targeted and graded interventions that account for the different frequency and risk of different exposures.

The main limitation of our analysis is the absence of data on the context of an exposure: setting, immunity, level of ventilation etc. The observed risks we report are averages over these unknown factors. Some of these factors might affect the risk score recorded by the app and the true risk in different ways: for example being indoors is linked to poorer ventilation, which increases true risk but not risk score. Manual tracing can obtain contextual data through interviews; in practice this data is sometimes used to assess risk, but it should be collected more systematically to build a more informed classification of risk. Recording direct or indirect information on the context of exposures, either through the app (e.g. by implementing indoor/outdoor detection) or linking it from external sources, could significantly improve risk assessment.

Another limitation of our study is the inclusion of exposures only when their risk score crossed the app's notification threshold, excluding transmissions resulting from a large number of very low-risk exposures. These transmissions are likely to play a role in the spreading of SARS-CoV-2 in specific settings, but are unlikely to be a major driver of the epidemic. Also, testing was not compulsory for contacts, therefore infections were likely under-reported and absolute transmission rates must be interpreted with caution. Biases in testing or reporting, such as increased propensity to get tested after learning that a close contact tested positive, could also have affected our results.

In summary, if deployed at scale, contact tracing apps for infectious diseases have potential not only as interventions to reduce transmission<sup>6,7</sup> but also as tools to develop quantitative epidemiological understanding. Doing this and translating it into improved interventions takes time. We should strive to accelerate and improve this process as a

key step toward preparedness for future epidemics. Tools and methods for quantitative risk measurement and assessment should be further developed and integrated into the public health toolbox for the benefits they can bring now and in readiness for rapid deployment at the start of the next pandemic.

Recent decades have seen increasing focus on ‘personalised’ or ‘precision medicine’: using an individual’s biomarkers to inform their treatment and disease prevention. Epidemiological interventions that are concerned with population health, based on exposures and risks, have a long way to go to catch up. But the benefit of doing so is clear: dynamically tailoring responses according to individual risks measured at scale could turn blunt instruments into sharp ones. Digital contact tracing and the analysis presented here are a step forward on the path to precision epidemiology.

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## Figure legends

**Figure 1: App risk score and duration of exposure correlate with probability of infection.** (a) The probability of reported infection, i.e. the probability of a contact reporting a positive test through the app shortly after receiving an exposure notification, as a function of three summary metrics of their exposure measurements ('predictors'): (i) the maximum risk score from any exposure window (each lasting 30 minutes), (ii) the cumulative risk score, summed over all exposure windows, (iii) the total duration of the exposure, summed over all exposure windows. The grey point illustrates our estimate for the probability of reported infection after 15 minutes at 2 metres' distance from an individual with standard infectiousness. Black points in the top panels indicate the bins used for the risk predictor. (b) Probability of reported infection disaggregated by month of notification. Central values correspond to maximum likelihood estimates, shading and

(small) whiskers indicate the 95% confidence intervals (n=7,047,541 contacts).  
Tabulated values can be found in Supplementary Tables S6,S7.

**Figure 2: The probability of transmission is affected by both duration and proximity as captured by the risk score.** Log-log plot of the probability of reported transmission, i.e. the probability that the contact reported a positive test that we attributed to the transmission event traced, as a function of the binned duration of exposure and the mean risk score per hour (i.e. cumulative risk score divided by duration). The solid lines connect the maximum likelihood estimates for each bin and the shading around these shows the 95% confidence intervals. Tabulated values can be found in Supplementary Table S8.

**Figure 3: The transmission probability per exposure window increases almost linearly with risk score.** The probability of reported transmission per exposure window, i.e. the estimated probability of transmission in an individual 30-minute exposure window followed by reporting of a positive test, as a function of the app-measured risk score for that window. Points show the maximum-likelihood estimate (n=2,507,879 contacts); error bars on the points indicate the 95% confidence intervals. We fit a weighted robust linear regression without intercept to the points, with shading around the line indicating the 95% confidence intervals in its gradient, highlighting that the probability of reported transmission is proportional to the app-measured risk score. Tabulated values can be found in Supplementary Table S9.

**Figure 4: Short, intermediate and long exposures all contribute to SARS-CoV-2 transmissions in the population.** Distributions over contacts of summary metrics for their app-recorded exposure measurements, shown separately for all contacts in the dataset (all of whom were notified, shown in blue) and for ‘transmissions’, i.e. only those contacts who reported a positive test result through the app in the observation window, for whom we attributed the transmission to the recorded exposure rather than the background risk (shown in red). Panel a: the distribution of the maximum risk score. Panel b: the distribution of the duration of exposure. Panel c: the distribution of the cumulative risk score over all exposure windows. Panel d: categories of contacts reflecting the context of their exposure. The first bar shows the fraction of contacts in each category; the other bars show the fraction of the overall cumulative duration of exposure, cumulative risk score and number of transmissions that are associated with each category. Panel e: the fraction of all actually traced transmissions that would still

be traced if only contacts with exposures longer than a given duration would be traced. This relative effectiveness of contact tracing at different thresholds corresponds also to the reduction in  $R_t$  in a counterfactual scenario with a higher notification threshold relative to the reduction in  $R_t$  in the factual scenario. Panel f: the fraction of contacts being infected during the recorded exposure and reporting a positive test, i.e. the ratio of transmissions to contacts, among all contacts with exposures longer than a given duration. Shading at the top of the bars in panels e-f shows the 95% confidence intervals from uncertainty on background risk. Tabulated values can be found in Supplementary Table S10.

## Methods

For all Methods subsections, greater detail is provided in Supplementary Methods.

### Data

All data for this study comes from contacts notified by the NHS COVID-19 contact tracing app between April 2021 and February 2022 inclusive. The data generating process for app data was non-trivial: the primary aim was successfully implementing a privacy-preserving and data-minimising contact tracing process, not generating data for epidemiological study. We analysed data recorded by the app with three different timings/frequencies: first, daily ‘analytics’ data; second, exposure data sent when a contact is notified of risky exposure; and third, exposure data sent when a contact reports a positive test. Nowhere in the data is there a unique identifier for each app user, and so connecting these three data sources required some application of logic, some assumption, and some subsetting of the data. We next explain each of these three data sources in turn.

First, we have described the daily analytics data previously<sup>6,7</sup>. Each correctly functioning installation of the app sent one ‘analytics packet’ of data daily (at midnight, regardless whether the user was notified that day). Each packet indicated whether or not the app user was notified of risky exposure on that day, and included four fields of ‘individual characteristics’ which we assumed were usually constant for an individual over the time scale of one round of contact tracing and testing (i.e. are effectively constant for the individual): their device model (e.g. ‘iPhone X’), their operating system version on this device, the postcode district (an area with mean population size of about 20,000 individuals) in which they reported residing, and their lower-tier local authority (LTLA, if ambiguous from the postcode district).

Second, when a contact was notified of a risky exposure to an anonymous case, their app sent one 'event packet' of data to the central server for each exposure window (lasting a maximum of 30 minutes) that had a risk score over the threshold for notification. These were sent separately from the daily analytics packets, and only at the time of notification. Data about proximity to any individual not reporting a positive test are never sent to the central server. Event packets included information on exposure proximity, duration and date, and the same four fields of individual characteristics as in the daily analytics packets. Events packets contained no information about the index case to whom the contact was exposed (such information is irretrievable by the app by design) except for whether their infectiousness at the time of exposure was encoded as 'high' or 'standard'. If a single continuous exposure event lasted more than 30 minutes, it was automatically split into multiple exposure windows that were considered separately; multiple exposures occurring at different times (i.e. a discontinuous meeting between the individuals) also resulted in separate exposure windows. Risk calculations were performed separately on each exposure window. As explained in Results, the overall risk score used by the app for each window was calculated by multiplying scores from proximity, duration and index infectiousness, and we normalised these overall scores by the value for a 15-minute exposure to an index case of standard infectiousness at a proximity of 2m. With this normalisation the threshold for notification used by the app was a risk score of 1.11 throughout the period analysed; this value was chosen as part of the intervention deployment, not as part of analysis here.

Third, if an individual reported a positive test in the app during the 'observation interval'—starting with their notification and ending 14 days after the exposure—the same event packets that were sent when the individual was notified were sent once more to the central server, identical except for a flag indicating that this is the report-positive stage not the notification stage.

Jointly analysing the second and third data sources—the event packets sent at notification and again at positive test—we could assign to each exposure window the binary outcome of 'positive test reported or not'. This follows because we could see which event packets were sent a second time with all data fields identical except for the flag indicating either notification or report-positive stage, and which event packets were not. An assignment of a reported-positive-test outcome to a given exposure window does not imply that that exposure window was causal for the individual becoming infected: the transmission event could have been caused by background risk or by any other exposure window for the same contact if they had multiple exposure windows.



When more than one risky exposure window was recorded between a contact and the index case, these were analysed separately for the risk calculation and sent as separate event packets to the central server. The absence of a unique individual identifier means that in general one cannot know whether  $N$  event packets sent on the same day (as determined by the date received centrally) with matching individual characteristics for the contact (device model, operating system version, postcode district and LTLA) were sent by (i) 1 contact with  $N$  risky exposure windows, or (ii)  $N$  contacts, who were notified on the same day and had matching individual characteristics, with 1 risky exposure window each, or (iii) anything in between. We therefore restricted the dataset of event packets to an unambiguous subset constructed as follows. From the daily analytics data we identified the subset of notifications (of risky exposure) when exactly one contact with a given combination of individual characteristics was notified on a given day; for each such notification, we assumed that all event packets with identical characteristics originated from the same contact, i.e. scenario (i) above. When more than one contact with given characteristics was notified on a given day, all event packets that day with those characteristics were excluded from analysis for simplicity. This procedure for grouping multiple event packets as being from the same contact is specifically for a single notification event of a given contact: if the same individual is notified multiple times during our study, each notification event (which will be at least a quarantine period apart from other notifications, by design) is treated as being from a separate individual, with a set of event packets associated to each event.

Extended Data Table 1 summarises sample sizes for the final dataset analysed in this paper. Supplementary Table S1 summarises sample sizes and aspects of the events packet data at three of the stages described above: before and after the grouping stage, and also for only those contacts who reported a positive test. The grouping stage—subsetting to instances when only a single contact with given characteristics was notified on a given day, for which the matching event packets can be grouped as from one contact—retains 60% of the events packets.

### **Empirical estimation of individuals' probability of testing positive from summary statistics**

In general, each contact in our dataset had multiple exposure windows, each of which had a duration (anything up to 30 minutes) and a risk score. We summarised this data for each contact into metrics including the maximum risk score from any of the windows, the cumulative risk score over all windows, and the cumulative duration over all windows. We binned (grouped) contacts by the value of their summary metrics, and within each bin calculated the fraction of contacts reporting a positive test in the observation interval. Confidence intervals on this fraction were calculated through the

associated binomial distribution (defined with the number of ‘trials’ equal to the group size and the number of ‘successes’ equal to the number of contacts reporting a positive test). We extrapolated our estimates to risk score 1 (i.e. 2 metres away from an index case with standard infectiousness for 15 minutes, indicated with a grey circle in Figure 1 as a point of comparison) via a quadratic fit. In Figures 2 and 4, the background risk estimate from the maximum-likelihood approach outlined below was subtracted from the result. In all figures, the x coordinate for each bin corresponds to the mean of all scores within the bin.

### Statistical modelling of the per-exposure-window probability of transmission

In reality, a given individual that reported a positive test was either infected by the background, or was infected in their first recorded window, or in their second recorded window etc. but which of these was actually the case is unknown. Hence we modelled the process in terms of risk parameters, shared between individuals, which are to be estimated. We developed a statistical model for the separate contributions to each individual’s overall risk from each of their exposure windows and from background risk. Specifically, we modelled the probability of individual  $i$  *not* reporting a positive test during the observation interval as

$$(1 - B_i) \times (1 - P_t(i\text{'s first window})) \times (1 - P_t(i\text{'s second window})) \times \dots \times (1 - P_t(i\text{'s last window}))$$

where  $B_i$  is the probability of background transmission (followed by reporting a positive test), and  $P_t(i\text{'s } n\text{th window})$  is the probability of transmission during the  $i$ ’s  $n$ th window (followed by reporting a positive test). The justification for this form is that if an individual does not report a positive test, this implies that they were not infected by the background (with subsequent reporting) *and* were not infected during their first window (with subsequent reporting) *and* not during their second window etc. The probabilities for each of these events not happening should thus be multiplied together to give the overall probability for none of them happening. We modelled  $B_i$  as  $1 - (1 - b_i)^\beta$ , defining  $b_i$  as the sum, over the 14 days following  $i$ ’s notification, of the weekly-smoothed mean daily fraction of geographically matched not-recently-notified app users that reported a positive test (and  $\beta$  is the associated regression coefficient for this term). For small values of  $b_i$  the background risk is simply rescaled by a factor  $\beta$ , i.e.  $B_i \approx \beta b_i$ ; for larger values of  $b_i$  the functional form accounts for saturation of risk. We modelled  $P_t(i\text{'s } n\text{th window})$  as depending only on the risk score recorded by the app for  $i$ ’s  $n$ th window. We binned risk scores into 8 bins, defining a single independent  $P_t$  parameter for each bin, such that the expression above could be rewritten

$$(1 - B_i) \times \prod_{j=1}^8 (1 - P_t(\text{bin } j))^{\text{(number of windows from } i \text{ with risk score in bin } j)}}$$

The probability that an individual  $i$  would report a positive test during the observation interval is one minus the expression above (the expression for them *not* reporting a

positive test in the interval). The likelihood is given by the product of all individuals' probabilities for their reported outcome for testing positive. We maximised the likelihood to estimate the parameters  $\beta$  and the per-window transmission probability for each of the 8 bins of risk score, plotted in Figure 3, and profiled the likelihood to obtain the confidence intervals. Figure 3 shows that the per-window transmission risk estimated for each of the 8 bins is proportional to the app-recorded risk score of that bin. We used a binning approach to allow the data to reveal this proportionality—instead of taking it to be true as a modelling assumption—because this proportionality serves as validation for the app's risk score capturing real risk.

As a robustness check, we developed likelihoods based on frailty models with several sources of heterogeneity among case-contact pairs in the model (see Supplementary Methods Section 1.6.2).

### Predictors and machine-learning classifiers

As basic input predictors for machine learning we used the maximum, mean and cumulative risk score, the duration, and the number of exposures in each bin of risk score. Additional predictors include date, region, rural/urban score, background rate of infections, day of the week with more exposure windows and peak daily duration. Classifiers used include logistic regression, gradient boosting machines<sup>31</sup> and extreme gradient boosting XGBoost<sup>32</sup> with 10, 100 and 400 rounds. Optimal strategies for amber notifications were obtained using a general approach for targeted interventions<sup>33</sup> presented in Supplementary Discussion.

31. Greenwell, B., Boehmke, B., Cunningham, J. & Developers, G. B. M. *gbm: Generalized Boosted Regression Models*. (2020).

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## Author contributions

L.F., C.W., J.P., A.L., M.C., M.B., C.F. conceptualised this work. L.F., C.W., J.P., A.F., M.K., D.T., C.F. did the analyses. All authors contributed to the writing and reviewing of this manuscript.

## Competing interests

L.F., C.W., and C.F. were named researchers on a grant from DHSC to Oxford University. M.K. has a data sharing agreement with UKHSA. D.T. was an employee of Zühlke which provided consultancy to UKHSA. M.C., M.B., A.L., J.P.G. and A.D.F. were employees or affiliated to UKHSA.

## Additional information

Supplementary Information is available for this paper. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to Luca Ferretti <luca.ferretti@bdi.ox.ac.uk> and Christophe Fraser <christophe.fraser@bdi.ox.ac.uk>.

## Data availability statement

Data access is managed by UKHSA, who will make available on request the data needed to replicate the key results, either via the UK Data Service or through direct request for data access to UKHSA (details on the process can be found at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accessing-ukhsa-protected-data>). Access is controlled for privacy reasons.

## Code availability statement

Code to replicate the analysis will be made available as part of the data sharing process by UKHSA at [https://github.com/ukhsa-collaboration/risk\\_scoring\\_nhs\\_covid19\\_app](https://github.com/ukhsa-collaboration/risk_scoring_nhs_covid19_app).

## Extended Tables

*Extended Data Table 1: **Summary statistics for the NHS COVID-19 app exposure dataset.***

*We report statistics only for exposure windows that were successfully grouped and assigned to a single contact. These windows represent about 60% of the whole dataset. See Supplementary Table S1 for further details on the raw exposure window data before the grouping stage.*

*Extended Data Table 2: **Summary statistics for different types of contacts in our dataset.***

*Household contacts (defined as contacts whose exposures cover more than 15 windows in a single day), recurring contacts (defined as non-household contacts whose multiple exposure windows occur on two different days or more), one-day contacts (defined as non-household contacts whose multiple exposure windows occur all in a single day) and fleeting contacts (defined as contacts with a single exposure window).*

## Extended Figures

*Extended Data Figure 1: **The app has more nuanced distance-duration rules than manual contact tracing.** Coloured regions show regions of the distance-duration space where contacts are notified digitally (depending on the infectiousness of the index case) or manually. These boundaries apply in theory, though in practice distances are imperfectly estimated from Bluetooth signal attenuation.*

*Extended Data Figure 2: **The probability of transmission depends linearly on duration and cumulative risk for short exposures, then sublinearly.** Log-log plots of the probability of reported infection (the fraction of notified contacts who report a positive test shortly after notification) and transmission (subtracting the maximum-likelihood correction for background risk) as a function of cumulative risk score and duration of exposure. Points correspond to maximum likelihood estimates. The brown bands show the 95% confidence interval for linear regressions on the points shown, i.e. a power-law relation between risk predictors and the probability of reporting a positive*

test. The maximum-likelihood estimates for the exponents are  $P_t \sim r_{cum}^{0.46 \pm 0.01}$ ,  $P_t \sim d^{0.47 \pm 0.01}$  (infection) and  $P_t \sim r_{cum}^{0.69 \pm 0.04}$ ,  $P_t \sim d^{0.76 \pm 0.04}$  (transmission). For the regressions of the probability of transmission, when restricting to low values of the risk predictor (cumulative risk <20, duration <3 hours), the relationships were approximately linear:  $P_t \sim r_{cum}^{0.95 \pm 0.07}$ ,  $P_t \sim d^{0.99 \pm 0.09}$  (orange bands), as expected from theoretical arguments. The  $\pm$  values shown in the exponents are standard deviations.

**Extended Data Figure 3: The monotonic relationship between the risk score per window and the probability of transmission in that window is robust with respect to the inclusion of individual heterogeneities in the model.** Maximum-likelihood estimates of the probability of reported transmission per exposure window, i.e. the estimated probability of transmission in an individual exposure window followed by reporting of a positive test, as a function of the binned app-measured risk score for that window. The grey line and shading show the maximum-likelihood monotonic risk (and the corresponding 95% CI) shown in Figure 3. Lines of different colours show maximum-likelihood estimates from models that do not assume monotonicity; these models include positive-test ascertainment and/or different functional forms for heterogeneities in risk (see Supplementary Methods Section 1.6.2).

**Extended Data Figure 4: The transmission probability per exposure window decreases for contacts located in conurbations and increases for low-risk exposures during the weekend.** The probability of reported transmission per exposure window, i.e. the estimated probability of transmission in an individual 30-minute exposure window followed by reporting of a positive test, is shown as a function of the app-measured risk score for that window, as in Figure 3 but with stratifications of contacts. Panel a: Stratification by weekday or weekend. Panel b: Stratification by rural area, urban area (town or city) and conurbation (urban agglomeration). Lines connect the maximum-likelihood estimates for each bin; shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.


**Extended Data Figure 5: Duration and cumulative risk are the best predictors of infection, only marginally improved by machine learning.** Sensitivity/specificity (receiver operating characteristic) curve for different methods and thresholds to classify individuals exposed to an index case as at risk or not. Our dataset contained only individuals who were actually notified; we varied the classification thresholds to interpolate between continuing to notify all of these individuals (top right) and notifying none of these individuals (bottom left). Different colours show different classification methods. For each method we varied thresholds to explore their balance between

sensitivity (notifying individuals who would report a subsequent positive test) and specificity (not notifying individuals who would not). ML abbreviates machine learning, AUC the area under the curve.


**Extended Data Figure 6: Illustration of optimal strategies to reduce social costs of contact tracing via amber/red alert notifications.** In this illustrative scenario we considered combinations of three measures: red notification leading to quarantine after notification, amber notification leading to PCR test after notification (followed by self-isolation if positive), and no notification. We assume that the risk of infection would be assessed based on duration of exposure. We consider optimal strategies leading to minimisation of total costs for patient and public health for a given epidemiological effectiveness; see Supplementary Discussion for details and assumptions on relative costs and effectiveness. Panel a: each horizontal line represents an optimal strategy (quarantining high-risk contacts, testing intermediate-risk contacts, not tracing low-risk contacts) that has the same effectiveness as a baseline quarantine-only strategy for contacts above a threshold duration of exposure (y axis). Panel b: the decrease in cost of the optimal strategy relative to the baseline strategy (quarantine for all traced contacts).

**Extended Data Figure 7: Illustration of optimal strategies to increase effectiveness of contact tracing via amber/red alert notifications.** Same as Extended Data Figure 6, but considering optimal strategies that keep the total costs fixed while maximising epidemiological effectiveness. Panel a: each horizontal line represents an optimal strategy that has the same cost as a baseline quarantine-only strategy for contacts above a threshold duration of exposure (y axis). Panel b: the increase in effectiveness of the optimal strategy relative to the baseline strategy.

probability of reported infection



probability of reported infection




month

- Apr/May21
- Jun21
- Jul21
- Aug21
- Sep21
- Oct21
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- Jan22
- Feb22




probability of reported transmission

risk score  
per hour



duration (hours)










probability of reported transmission  
per exposure window


2m,15min

app-measured risk score


0.000  
0.005  
0.010  
0.015  
0.020









Extended Data Fig. 1




Extended Data Fig. 2



Extended Data Fig. 3




Extended Data Fig. 4






Extended Data Fig. 5




## Quarantine for risky contacts



## Alternative: quarantine for high-risk contacts, testing for low-risk contacts



Extended Data Fig. 6



Extended Data Fig. 7

	Grouped events packets	Grouped event packets for individuals reporting a positive test
<b>Number of packets</b>	52,979,100	6,137,896
<b>Cumulative duration (hours)</b>	22,877,575	2,670,167
<b>Mean duration per window (minutes)</b>	26	26
<b>Number of contacts</b>	7,047,541	239,683
<b>Mean duration per contact</b>	3 hours and 15 minutes	11 hours and 8 minutes
<b>Mean number of packets per contact</b>	7.52	25.61

Extended Data Table 1

Type of contact	mean duration (hours)	mean risk score	% testing positive	mean risk score per hour	% of all contacts	% of duration from all exposures	% of cumulative risk score from all exposures	% of all transmissions
<i>household</i>	32.9	173.9	13	5.3	6	61	67	41
<i>recurring</i>	3.9	16.6	3.3	4.2	14	17	15	24
<i>single day</i>	1.6	6.6	1.5	4.2	32	15	13	25
<i>fleeting</i>	0.4	1.5	0.4	3.7	48	6	4.5	10

Extended Data Table 2

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|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
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| <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | A description of any assumptions or corrections, such as tests of normality and adjustment for multiple comparisons  |
| <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | A full description of the statistical parameters including central tendency (e.g. means) or other basic estimates (e.g. regression coefficient) AND variation (e.g. standard deviation) or associated estimates of uncertainty (e.g. confidence intervals) |
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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | For Bayesian analysis, information on the choice of priors and Markov chain Monte Carlo settings   |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | For hierarchical and complex designs, identification of the appropriate level for tests and full reporting of outcomes   |
| <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Estimates of effect sizes (e.g. Cohen's $d$ , Pearson's $r$ ), indicating how they were calculated   |

Our web collection on [statistics for biologists](#) contains articles on many of the points above.

### Software and code

Policy information about [availability of computer code](#)

Data collection	Data collection was performed using RATHENA (v2.6.1) queries of the database of private app data.
Data analysis	Analysis was performed in R, version 4.0.4, with use of packages data.table (v1.14.2), tidyverse (v1.3.2), gbm (v2.1.8.1), xgboost (v1.6). Code to replicate the analysis will be made available as part of the data sharing process by UKHSA at <a href="https://github.com/ukhsa-collaboration/risk_scoring_nhs_covid19_app">https://github.com/ukhsa-collaboration/risk_scoring_nhs_covid19_app</a> .

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request for data access to UKHSA (details on the process can be found at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accessing-ukhsa-protected-data>). Access is controlled for privacy reasons.

## Research involving human participants, their data, or biological material

Policy information about studies with [human participants or human data](#). See also policy information about [sex, gender \(identity/presentation\), and sexual orientation](#) and [race, ethnicity and racism](#).

Reporting on sex and gender	N/A
Reporting on race, ethnicity, or other socially relevant groupings	N/A
Population characteristics	N/A
Recruitment	N/A
Ethics oversight	Research Ethics Committee approval was not required because our analysis was performed on routinely collected, anonymised data that cannot be traced back to individuals, from a database built with the primary purpose of supporting public health.

Note that full information on the approval of the study protocol must also be provided in the manuscript.

## Field-specific reporting

Please select the one below that is the best fit for your research. If you are not sure, read the appropriate sections before making your selection.

☒ Life sciences ☐ Behavioural & social sciences ☐ Ecological, evolutionary & environmental sciences

For a reference copy of the document with all sections, see [nature.com/documents/nr-reporting-summary-flat.pdf](https://www.nature.com/documents/nr-reporting-summary-flat.pdf)

## Life sciences study design

All studies must disclose on these points even when the disclosure is negative.

Sample size	We used all available data
Data exclusions	No data were excluded from the analyses
Replication	This is a one-off observational study, with no replication possible.
Randomization	Not relevant - no use of experimental groups
Blinding	Not relevant - no use of experimental groups

## Reporting for specific materials, systems and methods

We require information from authors about some types of materials, experimental systems and methods used in many studies. Here, indicate whether each material, system or method listed is relevant to your study. If you are not sure if a list item applies to your research, read the appropriate section before selecting a response.

### Materials & experimental systems

n/a	Involved in the study
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Antibodies
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Eukaryotic cell lines
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Palaeontology and archaeology
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Animals and other organisms
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Clinical data
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Dual use research of concern
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Plants

### Methods

n/a	Involved in the study
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ChIP-seq
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Flow cytometry
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> MRI-based neuroimaging